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The Higher Education Act is now up for reauthorization.
2
 The 
Act provides support for both college and graduate students, and in-
stitutions themselves. Meanwhile, the Department of Education 
(DOE) is crafting rules to implement a “Revised Pay as You Earn” 
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(REPAYE) program to help borrowers not eligible for other income-
based repayment programs.
3
 As each program is crafted, policymak-
ers need to carefully consider the balance between mission and mar-
gin in the largely non-profit higher education sector.
4
 Mission in-
cludes the research, teaching, and service missions of the university. 
Margin refers to the stable financial base of support needed to main-
tain the quality and continuity of independent, civil society institu-
tions. 
 
Without some margin, higher education institutions cannot 
fulfill their mission. But without clear evidence that higher education 
institutions are actually serving the full scope of their missions, any 
margin is unjustified. This complex imperative—to assure the integri-
ty of educational mission while avoiding excessive costs—is at the 
core of higher education policy. There are also macroeconomic fac-
tors that make education policy decisions particularly consequential 
now. As reauthorization approaches, and REPAYE rules are drafted, 
Congress and the DOE should keep in mind four core principles that 
are often obscured in current policy debates. 
 
First, higher education policy must help ameliorate the effects 
of an era of economic inequality.
5
 Corporations have already shifted 
many risks to individuals by, for example, switching from defined 
benefit to defined contribution pension plans.
6
 Though most college 
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and graduate school graduates can pay their debts, in a higher educa-
tion system as open to innovation and experimentation as the United 
States’s, there will always be some individuals for whom higher edu-
cation does not pay off. For them, income-based repayment programs 
(IBR) are a crucial safety net. These programs should be strengthened 
by new legislation and rules. 
 
Second, states have dramatically cut back their support for 
higher education.
7
 A combination of tax cutting and expanding 
spending on prison populations and law enforcement has left public 
colleges and universities struggling to maintain programs and keep 
up with private institutions. Federal funding—whether for direct 
scholarship programs, or indirectly in the form of federal credit pro-
grams—must fill the gap left by the states, lest millions of individuals 
suffer economic exclusion. 
 
Third, institutions of higher education have broad and diverse 
goals and purposes, often inextricably intertwined, which funders 
need to respect and support. Unfortunately, a permanent austerity 
mindset among some members of Congress (and high level DOE of-
ficials) has created interest in cheap, technology-driven quick fixes to 
improve access to higher education. These range from online courses, 
to loosened accreditation standards, to the reconfiguration of univer-
sities as mere certifiers validating the acquisition of skills and learn-
ing elsewhere.
8
 While commendable as pilot programs, low-cost op-
tions should not be permitted to prompt a predictable “race to the 
bottom” in educational quality. As Australia learned when it made 
vocational education “contestable” (i.e., gave support to students in a 
variety of untested or barely validated options), there are numerous 
entities capable of cutting corners or even offering an entirely value-
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less “education” to students.9 Diploma mills, when left unchecked, 
can be enormously tempting profit centers for private capital. The re-
cent findings of the Senate HELP Committee on for-profit higher ed-
ucation in general should offer ample cautionary tales regarding sud-
den “disruption” of traditional institutions.10 
 
Fourth, higher education creates enormous value for both stu-
dents and society as a whole. Policymakers driven by a “return on in-
vestment” (ROI) framework for federal spending and credit programs 
should recognize the significant and lasting earnings premiums and 
human capital acquisition generated by higher education.
11
 Education 
policy should also recognize the intangible, hard-to-monetize, and 
long-term benefits generated by colleges and universities. However, 
even in the very narrow framework of ROI for better-skilled labor, 
extant federal investment in higher education is well worth it and 
ought to be increased. 
                                                          
 
9
  John Ross, Senate demands contestability review, THE AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 
12, 2015), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/senate-demands-
contestability-review/story-e6frgcjx-1227217379191 (“[P]rivate education compa-
nies had made hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from public subsidies at the 
same time public funding for technical and further education was being slashed.”); 
Leesa Wheelahan, Victorian TAFE chaos: a lesson in how not to reform vocational 
education, THE CONVERSATION (May 30, 2012), 
https://theconversation.com/victorian-tafe-chaos-a-lesson-in-how-not-to-reform-
vocational-education-7296.  
 
10
  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 112TH 
CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE 
FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 37 (Comm. Print 2012). 
The recent collapse of Corinthians, a for-profit chain, shows how devastating this 
business model can be for students taken in by it. 
 
11
  Memorandum on Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers 
Manage Their Debt, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (June 9, 2014) (“College remains a 
good investment, resulting in higher earnings and a lower risk of unemployment.”) 
(hereinafter Memorandum); Frank McIntyre & Michael Simkovic, The Economic 
Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014); David Leonhardt, Is Col-
lege Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/is-college-worth-it-clearly-new-data-
say.html?abt=0002&abg=0&_r=0; David Leonhardt, Even for Cashiers, College 
Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/sunday-review/26leonhardt.html; Michael 
Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551567; Michael Simkovic, 
Do Increases in the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW 
SCHOOL REP. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/08/do-
increases-in-the-cost-of-college-pay-for-themselves.html. 
2015 Democratizing Higher Education 5 
 
These four principles guide this essay’s commentary on two 
current policy debates in U.S. higher education financing. Part I ad-
dresses the DOE’s proposed regulations to implement REPAYE for 
income-driven repayment of federal student loans.
12
 Part II broadens 
the focus, making the case for lower interest rates on student loans 
and more generous debt forgiveness programs in the upcoming reau-
thorization of the Higher Education Act. The essay concludes with 
reflections on the macroeconomic value of higher education. 
I. EXTENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE REVISED 
PAY AS YOU EARN PLAN 
Federal student loan programs impose unique burdens and ob-
ligations on borrowers.
13
 Such loans are very rarely discharged in 
bankruptcy proceedings.
14
 However, since 1993, Congress has re-
quired the DOE to provide a repayment program that caps payments 
at a certain percentage of income, and forgives the debt after a certain 
term of years (Income-Contingent Repayment, or ICR).
15
 Given the 
unfavorable terms set by DOE at the time, the program was not wide-
ly used.
16
 However, it did provide some relief for borrowers caught 
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16
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Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 830-31 (2001) (“[P]olicymakers 
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between the Scylla of nondischargeability and the Charybdis of 
mounting debt. 
 
By 2007, Congress was ready to improve on the ICR pro-
gram. It mandated a new program, commonly deemed IBR (Income-
Based Repayment). Borrowers who are enrolled in IBR pay 15% of 
discretionary income each year.
17
 A person or family’s discretionary 
income is their adjusted gross income (AGI) minus 150% of the pov-
erty level for that person or family. For example, if a person’s AGI 
was $30,000 in 2015 and the poverty level was $10,000, discretion-
ary income would be $30,000 minus $15,000 (150% of $10,000) or 
$15,000. Accordingly, the yearly loan repayment would be capped at 
$2,250 (15% of $15,000). Moreover, all borrowers in this program 
would see the remainder of their debt forgiven after 25 years,
18
 while 
those in public service jobs (defined as full-time work for the gov-
ernment or a tax-exempt organization) would see forgiveness after 10 
years under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program.
19
 
 
However, it is important to note that the ultimate debt for-
giveness would count as income in the year in which it occurred. 
Thus, if a student chose payment options that only covered interest 
accrual (or less), there could be a sizeable tax bill due, particularly on 
the 25-year plan. Moreover, given spotty administration of the pro-
gram, many are concerned that borrowers will either be misled about 
the availability of forgiveness, or that government contractors will 
impose documentation hurdles on those attempting to avail them-
selves of IBR.
20
 
                                                                                                                                       
be repaid under the income- contingent repayment option. In fact, [as of 2000] few-
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  20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012). 
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19
  20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i). 
 
20
  Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, How the attempt to fix student loans got bogged 
down by the middlemen, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2015),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-education-
department-turned-into-a-massive-bank/2015/08/23/7618f2fa-1442-11e5-9ddc-
e3353542100c_story.html (“There are also questions about whether servicers, to 
maximize their profits, are misleading people about their repayment options. Advo-
cacy groups say rather than helping struggling borrowers enroll in income-driven 
plans — a time- and resource-heavy effort — servicers opt for an easier, short-term 
solution such as deferring the payments.”); DEANNE LOONIN AND PERSIS WU, 
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PARTNERSHIP WITH DEBT COLLECTION AGENCIES, 16-17 (2014), available at 
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Congress amended IBR in 2010 to shorten the repayment pe-
riod to 20 years and reduce the repayment obligation to 10% of dis-
cretionary income for those who borrowed in 2014 or later.
21
 In 2012, 
the Obama Administration deployed funds to permit those who had 
borrowed in 2007 or later and entered repayment in 2012 or later to 
enroll in this more generous version of IBR. Given extraordinary 
government profits from student loans in repayment (the govern-
ment’s costs of borrowing have been far lower than the interest 
earned from student debt), this was a fair change in policy. In 2014, 
President Obama called on the DOE to develop a program to assist 
pre-2007 borrowers on terms similar to those of extant IBR.
22
 DOE 
released a plan to do so in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
of July 9, 2015, deeming the proposed program the Revised Pay as 
You Earn plan (REPAYE).
23
 
 
Unfortunately, the DOE has proposed several conditions on 
entry into REPAYE of dubious merit either as a matter of policy or as 
a reflection of the President’s wishes. For example, DOE has chosen 
to include the borrower’s spouse’s income in calculations of the 10% 
repayment figure.
24
 As education finance law expert Philip Schrag 
has observed, this decision expressly contradicts the intent expressed 
by Congress in extant legislation on the issue.
25
 DOE has made the 
time-to-forgiveness twenty-five (25) years for those with any gradu-
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21
  20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e).  
 
22
  Memorandum, supra note 11. 
 
23
  Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12 (“On June 9 2014, the 
President issued a memorandum (79 FR 33843) directing the Secretary to propose 
regulations by June 9, 2015, that will allow additional students who borrowed Fed-
eral Direct Loans to cap their Federal student loan payments at 10 percent of their 
income.”). 
 
24
  Id. at 39609. 
 
25
  Philip Schrag, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal 
Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Pro-
gram, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts 
668, 662, & 685), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED-2014-
OPE-0161-1266 (“The statutory authority for ICR did not give the Department the 
authority to impose a marriage penalty on borrowers who file separate tax returns. 
It provides that ‘[a] repayment schedule . . . shall be based on the adjusted gross 
income . . . of the borrower or, if the borrower is married and files a Federal in-
come tax return jointly with the borrower’s spouse, on the adjusted gross income of 
the borrower and the borrower’s spouse.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(e)(2) (emphasis add-
ed). Thus, the Department is authorized only to base the repayment obligation on 
the AGI of the borrower, unless the borrower files a joint return.”).   
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ate school debt, even though it could have made it less.
26
 DOE has 
also included a number of confusing provisions about eligibility for 
non-accrual of interest once a borrower is enrolled in REPAYE.
27
 
One expert commenter opined that it may be impossible for many 
borrowers to accurately understand their rights and obligations under 
the program.
28
 
 
Other commenters also criticized REPAYE for being unduly 
complex and punitive. They made the case for shortening the repay-
ment period needed to earn forgiveness of debt, and softening or 
elimination of the marriage penalty in the proposed rules.
29
 Unfortu-
nately, the DOE may not fully understand the value of higher educa-
tion (see Part A) and the cost of federal credit programs (see Part B). 
Taking the true benefits and costs into account, the DOE would be 
well-advised to make the terms of REPAYE more accommodating 
and simpler (see Part C). 
A. The DOE Understates the Value of Higher Education 
The DOE should not understate the value of higher education. 
There is extensive work based on empirical data that independently 
documents the value of higher education.
30
 There is also sophisticated 
                                                          
 
26
  Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12. (“a borrower would 
qualify for forgiveness after 25 years if the loans being repaid under the REPAYE 
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27
  John R. Brooks, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions, Fed-
eral Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan 
Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (Proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pts 668, 662, & 685), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED-2014-
OPE-0161-2886. 
 
28
  Id. (“The complex way in which interest is forgiven will make it largely im-
possible for borrowers to estimate what their costs of repayment will be.”). 
 
29
  Senators have also weighed in to this effect. See Senators to Dept. of Educa-
tion: Proposed Changes to Student Loan Program could Harm Borrowers, Sheldon 
Whitehouse: U.S. Senator for R.I. (June 16, 2015), 
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-to-dept-of-education-
proposed-changes-to-student-loan-program-could-harm-borrowers. A proposal cur-
rently under review by the Department would, according to the Senators, “add un-
necessary complexity, increase costs for responsible low- and middle-income bor-
rowers, and result in the disparate treatment of graduate and undergraduate 
borrowers.” Id.  
 
30
  See, e.g., McIntyre & Simkovic, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Is College Worth 
It? Clearly, New Data Say, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Even for Cashiers, College 
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work synthesizing the literature of labor economists on the earnings 
premium conferred by higher education (and controlling for selection 
effects).
31
 The DOE should give a more fine-grained accounting of 
these benefits before imposing burdensome and complex limitations 
on the availability of loan forgiveness. 
 
There are also unique equity and timing considerations that 
recommend more generous treatment of the borrowers targeted by 
REPAYE who borrowed before 2008. Specifically, between 2008 
and 2013, student loans generated a $120 billion surplus for the gov-
ernment.
32
 The education attained by these borrowers created human 
capital that will pay dividends to the government, in the form of 
higher taxes and reduced need for social services, for years to come.
33
 
 
Moreover, pre-2007 borrowers could not have foreseen the 
global financial crisis that started in 2008 and devastated U.S. em-
ployment figures. Declines in employment in many fields were not 
due to a lack of initiative by such borrowers, and such borrowers did 
not cause and could not have foreseen many of the structural changes 
in the economy that hurt their earnings power. A cyclical downturn of 
greater intensity and duration than any the U.S. has experienced since 
the 1930s is ample reason for the DOE to use statutory authority to 
benefit borrowers straightforwardly, rather than creating a labyrinth 
of exceptions and exceptions to exceptions that can easily trap even 
the careful in suboptimal repayment plans. 
 
In summary, the DOE should accurately count the contribu-
tion of student borrowers to workforce preparedness, overall econom-
ic growth, and future tax revenues when considering the proper scope 
and nature of debt forgiveness through REPAYE. The education sec-
tor generates enormous value for the economy as a whole and for 
most graduates, but it is a fiscal and moral imperative that the DOE 
ease the plight of borrowers who are experiencing difficulty repaying. 
Given the rising costs of housing, child care, and medical care, pay-
ments above 10% of discretionary income could significantly com-
                                                                                                                                       
Pays Off, supra note 11.  
 
31
  Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11; Simkovic, Do Increases in 
the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, supra note 11.  
 
32
  Shahien Nasripour, Obama Student Loan Policy Reaping $51 Billion Profit, 
HUFFINGTON POST: HUFF POST POLITICS (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/obama-student-loans-policy-
profit_n_3276428.html.  
 
33
  Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11. 
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promise borrowers’ financial security. Just as the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) aims to help individuals and families avoid excessive 
health costs, so too should education finance policy promote financial 
security by better constraining debt repayment obligations.
34
 
B. The DOE Overstates the Cost of Loan Forgiveness 
Loan forgiveness is not a simple cost to government. Borrow-
ers who have financial difficulties may default on their loans due to 
their inability to pay. In such cases, forgiveness simply helps the bor-
rower avoid the kind of career-wrecking credit record that can keep 
defaulters from getting jobs (and paying taxes) years after they de-
fault. Without a more robust REPAYE program, there will probably 
be more defaults as bankruptcy judges try to expand the definition of 
“hardship” to accommodate overburdened debtors and debtors seek 
help with debts they are unable to repay.
35
 
 
The costs of the program are presented in an opaque way in 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM estimates 
the cost of REPAYE to the U.S. Treasury at $15.3 billion from 2016 
to 2025, but that figure is not adequately balanced by an estimate of 
the fiscal benefits of student loan programs overall to the Treasury 
and to the economy as a whole. The DOE should also take into ac-
count the work of Gregory Crespi, who projects a very low number 
of law graduates who are eligible for REPAYE and will enter into the 
program given the unfavorable terms for it drafted in the NPRM.
36
 
                                                          
 
34
  For ACA estimates, see Allison Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Fi-
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Health care regulation has long been characterized by the kind of complex interac-
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rin Fischer & Jack Stripling, An Era of Neglect, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 
(March 3, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/An-Era-of-Neglect/145045/. 
 
35
  Bernard, supra note 14; Iuliano, supra note 14. 
 
36
  Gregory S. Crespi, The Obama Administration’s New ‘REPAYE’ Plan for 
Student Loan Borrowers: Not Much Help for Law School Graduates (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629645.  
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Given the similar situation of many others in professional programs, 
estimates of the cost of these programs ought to be lowered. 
C. Recommendations 
Unfortunately, the NPRM draft on REPAYE does not reflect 
President Obama’s call for a streamlined route to improved IBR op-
tions for the borrowers it is supposed to serve. One key shortcoming 
is the administrative complexity of the proposal. Longstanding ex-
ecutive branch policy has called for reducing paperwork and dimin-
ishing the already great cognitive burdens on beneficiaries of gov-
ernment programs.
37
 REPAYE’s complex rules on many issues, 
including determination of which payments count upon entry or exit 
of an IBR program, or upon consolidation, will likely deter participa-
tion. Rules regarding capitalization of interest also must be clarified, 
and the government should, in general, avoid creating situations 
where compounding interest can leave a debtor liable for paying 
more than twice the amount he or she borrowed. There are already 
reports of servicers discouraging eligible borrowers from participat-
ing in Pay As You Earn (PAYE) because of its complexity (and os-
tensibly because they fear that Congress will change the rules). Such 
worries lead to unnecessary defaults. REPAYE will risk the same fate 
if its complexity renders it difficult to explain in a straightforward 
way. 
 
The marriage penalty embedded in the proposed rule is also 
unnecessarily harsh. Other commentators, such as Professor Phil 
Schrag, have amply explained the infirmities of the approach laid out 
in the NPRM. An unintended consequence of the NPRM draft will be 
strategic delays in marriage or divorces. The DOE should consider 
potential costs to the Treasury and disruptions to family life, attribut-
able to the strategic decisions it could encourage due to the marriage 
penalty now embedded in the NPRM. 
II. DEFENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE HIGHER 
EDUCATION ACT REAUTHORIZATION 
At present, students taking out federal loans to pay for higher 
education enjoy certain protections, including the income-contingent 
repayment options discussed above.
38
 Private lenders do not offer 
                                                          
 
37
  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013).  
 
38
  John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of 
Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), 
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such income-contingent repayment plans.
39
 Federal loans also help 
level the playing field in other ways.
40
 Private lenders can perform 
credit checks that, for those with low credit scores, can just as easily 
reflect misfortune or a bad economy as genuine credit risk.
41
 These 
credit checks can exclude those particularly in need of help. 
 
While federal loans are available to all at the same interest 
rates, private lenders often aim to charge subprime borrowers more 
than prime borrowers.
42
 Alternatively, they may charge borrowers 
from wealthy families (or attending wealthy institutions) less—a 
form of “cherrypicking” (choosing the best risks) familiar to the pre-
PPACA health insurance industry. Moreover, federal loans rarely re-
quire co-signers; private loans may.
43
 While federal loans offer op-
tions “to delay or temporarily forgo payments (like deferment and 
forbearance),” “discharge upon a borrower’s death,” and “discharge 
upon permanent disability (with certain limitations),” private loans 
may not offer any of these options.
44
 This divergence has led to pre-
dictable horror stories for borrowers who chose private loans.
45
 
 
In short, private loans impose a number of disadvantages on 
borrowers.
46
 Yet as the Higher Education Act comes up for reauthor-
                                                                                                                                       
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513359; see also Philip G. 
Schrag, Failing Law Schools—Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 387, 389 (2013).  
 
39
  Federal versus Private Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last visited August 1, 
2015). 
 
40
  Id.  
 
41
  For more details on biased and arbitrary credit checks and credit scoring, 
see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 23 (2015) (describing scores as 
“opaque, arbitrary, and discriminatory”). 
 
42
  Federal versus Private Loans, supra note 39. 
 
43
  Id. 
 
44
  What are the main differences between federal student loans and private 
student loans?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/545/what-are-main-differences-between-
federal-student-loans-and-private-student-loans.html (last visited August 1, 2015). 
 
45
  See Mary Pilon, When Student Loans Live On After Death, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 7, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704741904575409510529783860.  
 
46
  John R. Brooks and Jonathan D. Glater, Opinion, Raise the Cap on Federal 
Student Loans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-
ed/la-oe-0803-brooks-glater-bigger-student-loans-20150803-story.html (“Private 
student loans are usually much more costly for students; a government report from 
2012 found interest rates in excess of 16%, and nothing has improved since then. 
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ization, many commentators are now calling for the federal govern-
ment to act more like a private lender by raising student loan interest 
rates and cutting back on protections for borrowers. This advocacy is 
part of a larger debate about federal credit programs.
47
 For example, 
some argue that there is no market failure here and that private lend-
ers could take the government’s place.48 Observing the federal gov-
ernment’s long run of profits from the federal student loan program, 
one might apply that approach to education credit—if one were com-
pletely unaware of the many ways in which federal loans protect bor-
rowers. For others, this very protectiveness is suspicious. They argue 
that government credit programs must play by the same harsh rules as 
private lenders, or else quantify any ground they give as a loss that 
must be made up either by higher taxes, or reduced spending on other 
programs.
49
  
 
These two, contradictory positions create a pincer attack on 
federal loans. One set of critics argues that government gains from 
student loans simply indicate the superfluity of a federal role. Anoth-
er set insists that agencies need to act in as profit-oriented a manner 
as private lenders or account for their support in public accounting 
that fails to reflect the government’s unique role in credit creation. 
Either set of arguments can be deployed strategically by commenta-
tors to undermine support for student borrowers. White papers from 
the New America Foundation by Jason Delisle and Alexander Holt, 
which are critical of current policies for income-based repayment, are 
particularly troubling, given their assumption of a logic of austerity 
and zero-sum allocation of education resources.
50
 
                                                                                                                                       
By contrast, the rate on the most widely used federal student loan currently is 
4.29%. Private loans accounted for a quarter of all student lending in 2007-08 be-
fore falling sharply in the wake of the financial crisis. But because federal loan caps 
have not budged even as tuition has increased, private lending is rising again, and 
made up about 9% of new debt in 2013-14.”).  
 
47
  Michael Grunwald, The Real Bank of America, Politico (Jan./Feb. 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/federal-loans-bank-of-america-
113920.html.  
 
48
  Id. (“If the deals are low-risk layups, why is Uncle Sam involved?”).  
 
49
  Jason Delisle & Jason Richwine, The Case for Fair Value Accounting, 21 
Nat’l Affairs 95 (2014), available at 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-case-for-fair-value-
accounting. 
 
50
  JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, SAFETY 
NET OR WINDFALL? EXAMINING CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT FOR 
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS (2012), available at 
http://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/safety-net-or-windfall/ [hereinafter 
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Evocatively designed with images of raining $100 dollar bills 
and a mischievous-looking student eager to grab a “windfall” of loan 
forgiveness, the reports have garnered a great deal of media attention. 
Unfortunately, they fail to give an accurate picture of the benefits of 
IBR while exaggerating its costs. Safety Net or Windfall only manag-
es to paint IBR as a boon to the wealthy by idiosyncratically defining 
“high incomes” to include earnings that many would recognize as 
middle class—particularly in high-cost urban areas. Zero Marginal 
Cost presents some questionable distributive outcomes in a series of 
hypothetical repayment scenarios, but never presents solid evidence 
on how likely they are to come to pass. It would be inadvisable to al-
ter the IBR program now, to the detriment of students facing volatile 
demand for labor, in order to fight phantom shortfalls that may only 
arise decades from today—and may never come about at all. 
A. The Distributional Effects of Income Based Repayment 
The Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan and the Public Service 
                                                                                                                                       
SAFETY NET]; JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA EDUCATION, 
ZERO MARGINAL COST: MEASURING SUBSIDIES FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION IN THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM (2014), available at 
http://www.edcentral.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/ZeroMarginalCost_140910_DelisleHolt.pdf [hereinafter 
ZERO MARGINAL COST]. The New America Foundation has received funds from 
the Lumina Foundation, which has had close ties to private lenders. These lenders 
would greatly benefit from policy proposals to reduce federal loan forgiveness op-
tions and raise federal loan interest rates, because each move would make their own 
products comparatively more attractive. See, e.g., Molly Hensley-Clancy & Katie 
J.M. Baker, How a Private Foundation with Student Loan Ties Became a Force in 
Higher Education, BUZZFEED (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mollyhensleyclancy/how-a-private-foundation-with-
deep-ties-to-the-student-loan#.mqKyz8vP6. Lumina not only pays for research, but 
also pays for journalists to publicize the research. See Jennifer Ruark, To Shape the 
National Conversation, Gates and Lumina Support Journalism, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (July 14, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/To-Shape-the-National/140297/. 
According to its own history, “Lumina was sensitive to the perception that the 
Foundation was linked to the student loan industry” at its inception. LUMINA 
FOUNDATION, FROM THE GROUND UP: AN EARLY HISTORY OF THE LUMINA 
FOUNDATION 22 (2007), https://www.luminafoundation.org/files/resources/from-
the-ground-up.pdf. Given that important initial board members (and the current 
board chairman) had ties to private lenders, that is no surprise. Id., at 14 (Four 
founding board members of Lumina were former “directors of the Sallie Mae board 
of directors; all others had been members of the USA Group board.”); ALAN 
COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN SCAM 76 (2009). 
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Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF) are important income-based re-
payment programs. Presently, those who enroll in PAYE are only 
obliged to pay 10% of their discretionary income
51
 toward loan re-
payment, and their loans are forgiven after twenty years of pay-
ments.
52
 Borrowers eligible for PLSF, those who have spent ten years 
in full-time public service employment while repaying 10% of their 
discretionary income,
53
 are entitled to forgiveness of the remaining 
balance after ten years.
54
 
 
To Delisle and Holt, this “sounds like a get-rich-quick 
scam.”55 They are particularly concerned about “high-income” bor-
rowers using IBR to obtain debt forgiveness—even if their paid-
down principal and interest payments more than compensate the gov-
ernment for the cost of making the loan.
56
 They aim to require any 
single individual with an AGI over 300% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL) to pay 15%, rather than 10%, of AGI. They would force twen-
ty-five years of repayment onto those in PAYE if their loans exceed-
ed $40,000 when they entered repayment. In Zero Marginal Cost, 
they argue that “policymakers should consider changes to [PAYE] 
and PSLF that place greater limits on the benefits and the types of 
jobs that qualify borrowers for loan forgiveness.”57 
 
Given the benefits of higher education documented above, 
these recommendations are puzzling. Policymakers should be reward-
ing higher educational attainments, not worsening their terms of fi-
nancing. Federal borrowing costs are at very low levels—why impose 
further burdens on graduates when the government itself can borrow 
on global markets at such low rates?  
                                                          
 
51
  See Income-based Repayment, EDFINANCIAL SERV., 
http://www.edfinancial.com/IBR (last visited May 29, 2015). The site gives an ex-
planation of the calculation: discretionary income is adjusted gross income minus 
150% of the poverty level for a family of the size of the borrower’s family. Id.  
 
52
  Health Care & Educ. Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e) (2012)); Fed. Student Aid, 
Pay as You Earn Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-
loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (last visited May 28, 2015).  
 
53
  See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i) (2012). Public service employment is 
defined to include full-time service for any level of government and for any organi-
zation exempt from taxation under § 501(a) and described in § 501(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.  
 
54
  Id. 
 
55
  SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 1. 
 
56
  Id. at 11.  
 
57
  ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 50, at 23.  
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But the reports make sense given the priors of the authors. 
Delisle has questioned the value of graduate education and assistance 
to graduate students. “An undergraduate degree, we’ve all sort of de-
cided, is a must for earning a middle-class income,” he has stated. “A 
master of arts? Probably not. These are all people who have an un-
dergrad degree. They have all made it, in that sense. They are a suc-
cess. The question then is, ‘What is the purpose of the public support 
of the master’s degree?’”58 This viewpoint is a milder version of that 
of his New America colleague, Kevin Carey, who would essentially 
end the university as we know it.
59
 New America’s education policy 
group appears to have both a long and short game: reduce federal 
support for graduate schools now, while encouraging the “creative 
destruction” of institutions of higher education in the long run. Un-
surprisingly, the two objectives further the commercial interests of 
the private student lending interests so influential at the Lumina 
Foundation’s inception, and those of the technology firms which also 
support New America.  
 
In Zero Marginal Cost, Delisle and Holt present a variety of 
scenarios in which holders of graduate degrees may be earning an 
above-average income, but still enjoy some student loan debt forgiv-
en. For Delisle & Holt, this is problematic because loan forgiveness 
creates a moral hazard problem—why should students borrow re-
sponsibly, they ask, if they are certain that the amounts borrowed will 
be forgiven? But this view underestimates the problems of current in-
come based repayment programs, including worries about their effect 
on credit scores and the tax consequences of forgiveness of long-
accruing interest. They claim that their work is based on a “more 
comprehensive and long-term perspective of how IBR affects differ-
ent types of borrowers, particularly as borrowers’ incomes change 
over their repayment terms.”60 However, its “long-term” projections 
regarding the costs of these programs are premised on an inadequate 
evidence base. Worries over “irresponsible” borrowers are also more 
properly targeted at for-profit programs’ abuse of credit programs, ra-
                                                          
 
58
  Vimal Patel, Grad-School Debt is Said to Rise Rapidly and Deserve More 
Policy Attention, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Grad-School-Debt-Is-Said-to/145539/.  
 
59
  See Audrey Watters & Sara Goldrick-Rab, Techno Fantasies, INSIDE 
HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/03/26/essay-challenging-kevin-
careys-new-book-higher-education.  
 
60
  SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 3.  
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ther than student loans as a whole.
61
 
B. Accurately Accounting for Education’s Costs & Benefits 
The New America Foundation’s (NAF) promotion of harsher 
terms for PAYE and PLSF is premised on the idea that these pro-
grams will eventually prove to be an unsustainable fiscal burden. 
However, PAYE and PLSF should be judged as part of a larger stu-
dent loan program. That program has proven to be a net benefit to 
government finances. The government has made tens of billions of 
dollars each year from students.
62
 Under established Federal Credit 
Reform Act (FCRA) models, the government made $120 billion from 
student loan programs from 2008 to 2013.
63
  
 
Some have tried to downplay projected gains from the pro-
grams by promoting an alternative accounting approach, “fair-value 
accounting” (FVA). This approach derogates the federal student loan 
program as a fiscal burden by effectively assuming (a) that the gov-
ernment could instead lend at the higher rates now prevailing at pri-
vate institutions, and (b) that defaults will rise. The first argument 
fails for several reasons.
64
 As Matt Yglesias states, “costs reported in 
                                                          
 
61
  Stefan Collini, Sold Out, LONDON REV. BOOKS Oct. 24, 2013, at 3-12, 
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n20/stefan-collini/sold-out.  
 
62
  Shahien Nasiripour, Student Loan Rates Boost Government Profit as Debt 
Damps Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/student-loan-rates-debt-
economy_n_3048216.html.  
 
63
  Id.; see also Congressional Budget Office, No. 4705, Options to Change In-
terest Rates and Other Terms on Student Loans (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44318-StudentLoans.pdf (“Under FCRA’s 
rules, CBO estimates, savings from the program will be $184 billion for loans made 
between 2013 and 2023”). The CBO later promoted a different accounting method, 
but has not explained convincingly why it wants to depart from past methodology. 
See Mike Konczal, Do Taxpayers Care if Student Loans are Paid Off Too Quickly? 
(On Fair Value Accounting), NEXT NEW DEAL (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/do-taxpayers-care-if-student-loans-are-
paid-too-quickly-fair-value-accounting. Moreover, the CBO is required by law to 
use FCRA standard accounting, and when it does so, it consistently finds “negative 
subsidies” (i.e., profits) regarding student loan programs. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS – BASELINE PROJECTIONS (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44198-2015- 
03-StudentLoan.pdf (“the federal government will save on average about 11 cents 
for each new dollar loaned in 2016”).  
 
64
  David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 
IND. L.J. 724, 771 (2013) (calling approaches like FVA “much more misleading 
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the budget are generally lower than the costs to the most efficient pri-
vate financial institutions because the government’s costs of funds 
are in fact lower.”65 At an even more elementary level: what would 
be the point of a federal loan program if it simply copied the terms 
and rates of private lenders? Rate-setting for federal student loans al-
so needs to acknowledge the harshness of the present bankruptcy re-
gime: students already facing presumptive nondischargeability should 
not be further burdened with higher interest rates. 
 
It is hard to overstate how radical a change FVA would pre-
sent to current, accepted standards. For the years 2015 – 2024, “The 
Department of Education’s four largest student loan programs would 
yield budgetary savings of roughly $135 billion under [long-
established] FCRA accounting but cost roughly $88 billion on a fair-
value basis.”66 Of course, those committed to an ideological vision of 
shrinking government would rejoice at this potential sea change in 
accounting.
67
 Meanwhile, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
(CBPP) has soberly documented the fundamental misunderstandings 
about the nature of government spending it encompasses.
68
 In 2012, 
                                                                                                                                       
than . . . enlightening”). 
 
65
  Matt Yglesias, Fair Value Accounting Overestimates Lending Costs, SLATE 
(Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/04/10/fair_value_accounting_overesti
mates_lending_costs.html. 
 
66
  U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF 
SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR 2015 TO 2024 (2014), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/45383-
FairValue.pdf. Even when constrained by FCRA, the CBO has overestimated the 
cost of health care programs repeatedly. Frank Pasquale, Politicized Prognostica-
tion at CBO, BALKINIZATION (July 28, 2009), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-at-cbo.html (quot-
ing Bruce Vladeck, former administrator of the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion) (“‘The CBO’s track record in predicting the effects of health legislation is 
abysmal. Over the last two decades, the CBO has routinely overestimated the costs 
of expanded government health care benefits and underestimated the savings from 
program changes designed to reduce expenditures.’”). 
 
67
  PAUL RYAN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE PATH TO 
PROSPERITY: RESTORING AMERICA’S PROMISE 43-44 (2013), 
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf (“Accounting for 
market risk in scoring these programs [student loans] would simultaneously reflect 
their true cost to taxpayers and make risky expansions of these programs less likely 
to occur.”). Note that many who share this position also favor “dynamic scoring” of 
tax cuts, which presume economic effects from tax cuts long ago dismissed by Re-
publican George H.W. Bush as “voodoo economics.”  
 
68
  RICHARD KOGAN, PAUL VAN DE WATER, & JAMES HORNEY, CTR. ON 
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Center for American Progress (CAP) criticized fair value as “an ac-
counting trick” designed “to make credit programs appear more ex-
pensive than they truly are.”69 CAP argued that FCRA budgeting al-
ready accounts for “credit risk,” and that accounting for “market 
risk”—“the rate a risk-averse private investor would charge for the 
perceived variability in [FCRA] estimates”—is not only unnecessary, 
it produces inaccurate budget estimates, adds “phantom” costs that 
never materialize, and harms credit programs.
70
 
 
Concern about future defaults raises an issue that is concen-
trated in for-profit schools: 46% of 2012 defaulters (on loans that en-
tered repayment in 2010) “attended for-profit colleges, which en-
rolled just 13% of students nationally.”71 Limitations of funds for 
students at schools with high default rates would be far more targeted 
an approach than across-the-board limits.
72
 Indeed, with the imple-
mentation of Gainful Employment rules targeting for-profit colleges, 
the DOE has already begun to address the issue.
73
 Moreover, as data 
emerges about borrower profiles, it appears that defaults are most 
common among those with the smallest debts—again, undermining 
the popular narrative that graduate students with large loan balances 
are fiscal threats.
74
 
                                                                                                                                       
BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE BILL WOULD ARTIFICIALLY INFLATE COST 
OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-23-12bud4.pdf 
 
69
  John Griffith, An Unfair Value for Taxpayers: “Fair-Value” Budgeting is a 
Dangerous Game to Play with Federal Loans and Guarantees, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS 1 (Feb. 9, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/fair_value.pdf. 
 
70
  Id. at 1-2. 
 
71
  New Data Confirm Troubling Student Loan Default Problems: For-Profit 
Colleges Still Have Highest Rate, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/CDR_2013_NR.pdf. 
 
72
  It should also be sensitive to documented default rates. Graduate schools in 
general have lower rates of default than undergraduate institutions, a fact not 
acknowledged adequately in Zero Marginal Cost. See generally ZERO MARGINAL 
COST, supra note 50. 
 
73
  Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Increases Accountability for Low-
Performing For-Profit Institutions, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-obama-administration-increases-
accountability-low-performing-profit-institutions (last visited July 1, 2015).  
 
74
  Susan Dynarski, Why Students With Smallest Debts Have the Larger Prob-
lem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/upshot/why-
students-with-smallest-debts-need-the-greatest-help.html (“It’s natural for people 
listening to the politicians to connect the two facts with a causal arrow: More debt 
leads to more default. But the reality is surprising: Borrowers who owe the most are 
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Any estimate of future defaults in the student loan context 
should adequately acknowledge how harshly bankruptcy law treats 
such debts with a presumption of nondischargeability. Moreover, es-
timates should not be based on extant private loan markets, because 
that is where the worst credit risks now are likely to be concentrated. 
There is a potential ratchet effect here, too. If private lenders continu-
ally lend at a rate a few percentage points above the public rate, and 
FVA requires public lenders to lend at the private rate, then future ad-
justments to government rates to reflect private rates at one point in 
time may simply empower private lenders to charge more at a later 
point in time. This is a particular danger if the private student loan 
market again becomes as concentrated as it was in the mid-2000s.
75
 
 
Whatever one believes about FVA, and the changes to PAYE 
and PLSF that the programs’ critics would make based on it, the ul-
timate impact of the critics’ proposals is clear: financing an education 
will become more expensive. That would either reduce the quantity 
or price of education (to the extent it is dependent on loan programs), 
or reduce the discretionary income of students and graduates, or, 
most likely, have some combination of these effects. Each possibility 
is likely to have negative effects. 
 
Decades of empirical research in labor economics establish 
that higher education not only correlates with improved labor market 
outcomes: it causes them. Investments in higher education also con-
tribute to faster innovation and more rapid economic growth.
76
 
Delisle and Holt warn about IBR subsidizing “high-cost graduate and 
professional schools.”77 But costs and quality are correlated: aside 
from those in the for-profit sector, more expensive programs devote 
more resources to instruction and therefore produce better student 
outcomes. Student loan default rates are typically lower for more ex-
pensive and higher quality programs, while default rates are higher 
for less expensive and lower quality programs and those with lower 
                                                                                                                                       
least likely to default.”).  
 
75
  DEANNE LOONIN, THE SALLIE MAE SAGA: A GOVERNMENT-CREATED, 
STUDENT DEBT FUELED PROFIT MACHINE (2014); ALAN COLLINGE, THE STUDENT 
LOAN SCAM 13 (2009) (“By 2006, Sallie Mae virtually dominated the student loan 
industry. It was about four times larger than its nearest competitor (Citibank), 
manag[ing] $123 billion in student loans.”).  
 
76
  See generally Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 527 (2013).  
 
77
  SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 13. 
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completion rates.
78
 
 
Higher education provides public benefits in the form of in-
creased income and payroll tax revenues and lower burdens on pub-
licly-funded social services. The tax revenue benefits alone—
approximately forty percent of every extra dollar an individual earns 
because of increased educational attainment—are typically more than 
enough to fully cover the costs of higher education.
79
 Most individu-
als who defer payment of their loans in early years while their in-
comes are low will eventually repay their loans in full and with inter-
est. Educated workers’ earnings grow rapidly as they gain experience 
and typically peak decades after they have completed their degrees. 
Even partial repayment of a loan can still produce a profit for lender 
because the partial payments are often more than sufficient to cover 
financing and administrative costs. 
 
Critics of IBR say that life-cycle equities counsel against for-
giving loans at ten or twenty years into repayment because a borrow-
er may be entering a highly paid phase of their career. But to correct 
for that fairly, they should also be advocating for reducing how much 
borrowers must pay at earlier, lower-paid phases of their career. Life-
cycle equity cannot be a one-way ratchet toward squeezing borrow-
ers, or else the concept loses all meaning. 
C. Fiscal Analysis of Loans should not be Partial 
Program performance should be evaluated with respect to the 
percent of loans originated, not the percent currently outstanding. 
Many successful graduates repay their loans and shrink their balanc-
es, while those who are less successful defer payment and grow their 
balances.
80
 Measuring performance of the percent of loans outstand-
ing introduces survivorship bias.
81
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supra note 11. Consider as well recent evidence on for-profit law schools. Patricia 
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If federal student loans were abolished in favor of private 
provision of credit, students would be forced to pay more for an edu-
cation of lower quality.
82
 Furthermore, more education spending 
would go to interest payments and less would go to instruction and 
support services that benefit students.
83
 Additionally, fewer students 
would complete their degrees, unemployment would be higher, eco-
nomic growth would be slower, and the federal budget would be on a 
shakier footing than it is today.
84
 
As technology changes the job market, graduate education is 
needed more than ever. Yet the risks inherent in training are also 
high. For example, while open pharmacist positions were once plenti-
ful, now pharmacists in most states “are seeing either a surplus of 
candidates, or a rough balance of supply and demand.”85 It may take 
a few years for a new equilibrium to be reached, as older pharmacists 
retire, or newer ones take on roles in accountable care organizations, 
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patient-centered medical homes, integrated community health man-
agement teams, or other innovative forms of health delivery and ad-
ministration. IBR is designed to assure that students who take on the 
risk of investing in their human capital are not beset by onerous re-
payment obligations if, through no fault of their own, structural 
changes in the economy or cyclical downturns adversely affect their 
employability.
86
 And, for those individuals who do not attain above-
average incomes, it offers a fair deal: the debt burden eventually ends 
for those for whom education has not been a winning financial prop-
osition. The alternative, of perpetual obligations, is deeply unfair, 
given norms enabling bankruptcy and “fresh starts” for nearly all oth-
er forms of debt.  
 
Against such reasonable present accommodations of risk in an 
era of precarity, Delisle and Holt’s Zero Marginal Cost presents scare 
scenarios stretched decades into the future. Even a professional labor 
economist would probably blanch at predicting the likely income pat-
terns of professionals, let alone their repayment strategies, decades 
hence. By and large, graduates from non-profit graduate schools en-
tering repayment tend to hear advice like Heather Jarvis recently of-
fered to recent law school graduates on the American Bar Association 
website: 
[There are] federal student loan repayment plans that in-
clude low monthly payments based on income. But under-
stand that the longer it takes you to repay your loans, the 
more you will pay over time. If you can establish an ag-
gressive repayment strategy, you can significantly lower 
the cost of your loans over time.
87
 
Finally, even if a much higher than expected percentage of graduate 
students take advantage of IBR, there is plenty of time to deal with 
that putative crisis when it arises, rather than preemptively imposing 
austerity on recent graduates facing a volatile job market. 
 
Some claim that loan forgiveness just leads to tuition infla-
tion, but it is difficult to verify that claim.
88
 The “sticker price” of 
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many schools is indeed high—but close examination of net tuition 
paid over the past twenty years tells a more nuanced story. After ad-
justing for inflation, David Leonhardt reports, net tuition and fees at 
private four-year colleges rose 22% from 1992-2014, and 60% at 
public four-year colleges.
89
 Gas prices rose 83% in that period, and 
child care, 44%.
90
 In graduate schools, the data is not as robust, but 
“price wars” in legal education have been going on for years. While it 
is intuitively plausible that increases in federal support for education 
cause increases in tuition (a proposition known as the “Bennett Hy-
pothesis,” for former Secretary of Education William Bennett),91 ac-
tual evidence is mixed. As Michael Simkovic has observed, “there is 
little evidence in the peer-reviewed literature that increases in the 
availability of public student loans drive up tuition net of scholarships 
and grants at non-profit and public institutions of higher education.”92 
Simkovic observes that “there is some evidence” that the Bennett 
Hypothesis holds for for-profit trade schools, but this is a problem 
better targeted by rules governing those schools, not ones undermin-
ing financing opportunities generally (or pushing students out of gov-
ernment lending programs and into more risky private ones).
93
 
 
Delisle and Holt fail to give a credible estimate of the overall 
negative fiscal impact of even their own very high estimates of future 
participation in loan forgiveness programs. And if they had to esti-
mate all the positive impacts professional schools have on our econ-
omy—such as leading “meds & eds” redevelopment of inner cities, 
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research on cutting edge medicine, and care and advocacy for the 
most marginal members of our society, to name a few—they would 
find that the government, if anything, massively underfunds the edu-
cation sector. Education is a public good, and plans to increase the 
cost of its financing are likely to reduce growth and productivity. 
D. Cutting PAYE and PLSF is an Unwise Policy 
Delisle & Holt’s recommendations for IBR promise little, if 
any, savings to the federal government once a full accounting of the 
benefits of education is made. Squeezing the often precarious financ-
es of young graduates will not contribute to economic growth or fis-
cal stability. Delisle’s work is not limited to student loans; he has also 
advocated for “fair value accounting” as a general principle of budg-
eting.
94 
As the CBPP has observed, this approach would artificially 
inflate the cost of a wide array of federal credit programs—thereby 
either reducing their availability, or raising their costs to beneficiar-
ies.
95
 This campaign against federal credit programs would impose a 
double bind on virtually any federal loan: if it makes too much mon-
ey for the government, it is characterized as something the market 
should do, while if it loses money, it’s shamed as a Solyndra-style 
subsidy.
96
 
 
Many students who might be afraid to enroll without IBR will 
not actually end up needing IBR. Even if they do, many will probably 
still pay enough in interest and taxes that the government comes out 
ahead. This is why insurance is, overall, a profitable business—
individuals are overly risk averse. Providing contingent, targeted so-
cial insurance to students via PAYE and PLSF is a small price to pay 
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for increasing the United States’ economic competitiveness, and it 
may not be a price at all. The question is: in aggregate, does IBR in-
crease tax revenue and student loan revenue by more than its cost? 
This depends on how it affects behavior of would-be students. Given 
the high rate of return on education and high marginal tax rates on 
educated labor, it doesn’t take much of a boost to enrollments and 
educational attainment for IBR to generate a profit for the federal 
government. 
 
By raising alarms about the possibility of borrowers, decades 
hence, filing en masse for debt forgiveness, NAF is building a case 
for cutting back on loan forgiveness. If it succeeds, students are likely 
to rely more heavily on private loans. This could be a disaster for bor-
rowers, because private lenders often have no legal obligation to ad-
just their terms if borrowers become ill or lose their jobs, whereas 
government loans include provisions for income-based repayment 
and waivers for certain disabilities. Cuts to IBR would also burden 
the U.S. economy with a less-educated labor force, less able to pay 
the taxes needed to improve the country’s fiscal outlook. It would be 
unwise to radically change PAYE and PSLF on the basis of specula-
tive projections. 
III. CONCLUSION: BRINGING THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION BACK IN 
Policymakers should be wary of the dominant critiques of the 
federal role in lending, especially given troubling alternatives like in-
creased private loan provision. A common talking point is that gov-
ernment is spending too much on its credit programs, but there is no 
documented unfair subsidy of student loans. There is some dispute—
proponents of traditional accounting show a government profit from 
the loans, while the “fair value accounting” (FVA) approach shows a 
loss.
97
 But FVA is based on a category mistake about the govern-
ment’s cost of lending, and ignores the documented reduction in costs 
via government lending.
98
 Moreover, until the law of government ac-
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counting is changed, it makes little sense to cite the idiosyncratic, bi-
ased, and ideologically driven FVA analysis. It serves to corrode the 
terms of credit available to students while doing nothing to advance 
its purported fiscal aims. 
 
Without competition from federal loans, private lenders will 
fill the vacuum, offering shoddier terms to most borrowers (such as 
no IBR, higher interest rates, and harsher repayment terms).
99
 Some 
claim that higher rates on loans will lead students to demand lower 
tuition, end up with a lower principal balance, and keep monthly 
payments at an equilibrium. But the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York has found that “changing the mortgage rate by 2 percentage 
points only changes willingness to pay by about 5 percent on aver-
age” for mortgages.100 Is elasticity of demand higher for higher edu-
cation than for houses? If not, projected cost savings from interest 
rate increases are likely to be minimal at best. Critics of IBR have not 
credibly demonstrated that federal lending distorts the higher educa-
tion market more than it makes up for predictable market failures. 
Even worse, if federal lending programs’ terms become more harsh, 
private lenders may further entrench inequalities by imposing ever 
more “risk-based” pricing—for example, by charging higher interest 
rates to students at lower ranked schools in order to subsidize lower 
rates at higher ranked schools. Such pricing may end up a self-
fulfilling prophecy: students paying a higher interest rate will have a 
more difficult time paying off their loans precisely because of the 
higher rate. 
 
The comparison between housing and education is instructive 
in another sense. At present, interest rates on mortgages are much 
lower than interest rates on Grad PLUS loans for law students and 
other graduate students. There is not much independent good in peo-
ple investing in owning their homes, as opposed to their investing in 
mutual funds, bonds, or real estate investment trusts of properties 
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more diversified than a single family’s home.101 Those working hard 
to invest in their human capital to be engineers, nurses, social work-
ers, lawyers, and other professionals, are more clearly contributing to 
society. So, if we accept a basic assumption that ease of lending 
terms raises the value of the thing or service the lending is for, then 
rates should be reversed: graduate loans should be less expensive 
than mortgage loans. 
 
Many educators are concerned about the rising cost of educa-
tion for low-income and middle class households. However, simply 
“reducing costs” is a deeply troubling policy response, since the im-
pact on equity and quality are far from clear. The majority of college 
instruction is done by exploited adjuncts; it is hard to imagine how 
their “cost” could be cut further.102 Revenues at educational institu-
tions could be productively reallocated, but there is little to no objec-
tive evidence that higher education itself takes an unfair share of na-
tional GDP.
103
 Assuming standard levels of economic growth, 
societies may rationally choose to devote more resources to human 
services like education and health care, and less to, inter alia, military 
and finance costs.
104
 These macroeconomic principles should guide 
future policy directions in the financing of higher education. 
 
We are now entering a critical phase in the development of 
income-based repayment. The program is not helping many of the 
students it was designed to aid. At the very least, potential enrollees 
need straightforward tools to compare the value of various repayment 
plans. More substantively, they need faster enrollment and better 
terms offered by those plans. Almost no borrowers should be in de-
fault on loans qualified for IBR, but arduous requirements for gaining 
IBR protections (or incompetence or misinformation from servicers) 
have left struggling debtors vulnerable. Even worse, some commenta-
tors are using the existence of IBR to justify harsh treatment of stu-
dent loans in bankruptcy—even though it is now clear that it could hit 
some borrowers with a large tax penalty and unknown risks to credit 
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scores. If education finance reform moderates do not substantially 
improve the terms and accessibility of IBR, the program will lose 
popularity and credibility. 
 
